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Abstract—Domain Name System (DNS), one of the important
infrastructure in the Internet, was vulnerable to attacks, for the
DNS designer didn’t take security issues into consideration at
the beginning. The defects of DNS may lead to users’ failure of
access to the websites, what’s worse, users might suffer a huge
economic loss.
In order to correct the DNS wrong resource records, we
propose a Self-Feedback Correction System for DNS (SFCSD),
which can find and track a large number of common web-
sites’ domain name and IP address correct correspondences
to provide users with a real-time auto-updated correct (IP,
Domain) binary tuple list. By matching specific strings with
SSL, DNS and HTTP traffic passively, filtering with the CDN
CNAME and non-homepage URL feature strings, verifying with
webpage fingerprint algorithm, SFCSD obtains a large number
of highly possibly correct IP addresses to make an active manual
correction in the end. Its self-feedback mechanism can expand
search range and improve performance.
Experiments show that, SFCSD can achieve 94.3% precision
and 93.07% recall rate with the optimal threshold selection in
the test dataset. It has 8Gbps processing speed stand-alone to
find almost 1000 possibly correct (IP, Domain) per day for the
each specific string and to correct almost 200.
Keywords—DNS, Self-feedback, Active and Passive Measure-
ment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the important in-
frastructure in the Internet, providing correspondence between
domain name and IP address for almost all kinds of the upper
applications. As the DNS designer didn’t consider the security
issues at the beginning [16], many attackers are targeting
DNS. Once the DNS Resource Records (RRs) are incorrect,
they may cause a large scale of network paralysis [25].
In Figure 1, a user types a domain name in the browser
and presses Enter at first. Then, as is shown in step 1 to step
4, through a series of DNS requests and responses among
the personal computer and each layer domain name server in
the back, the browser gets one or several IP addresses which
have access to the websites successfully in the last step 5.
Under normal circumstances, the browser can get the correct
IP addresses to access the correct websites.
However, except the non-malicious server configuration
error [8], in the process represented by the dashed arrows,
there are many causes for incorrect DNS RRs, such as DNS
spoofing [9], DNS cache poisoning [23]. Attackers can utilize
Fig. 1. After a user press Enter.
DNS spoofing by pretending to be the domain name server
to return a wrong IP address to the browser [26], or use
DNS cache poisoning to inject illegal domain name into DNS
server’s cache [23], or even more, they can intercept DNS
requests to make them lose their responses within a range of
network to DNS hijacking [14].
There are already a lot of solutions for the above-mentioned
attacks. In this paper, the main idea is to find correct (IP,
Domain), not to prevent the attacks, but to avoid them. We
propose a fast, self-feedback system to find and track a
large number of common websites’ domain name and IP
address correct correspondences with a real-time dynamic
auto-updated mechanism by using passive measurement with
SSL, DNS and HTTP traffic, filtering with the CDN CNAME
and non-homepage URL feature strings, and verifying with
webpage fingerprint algorithm and active functions.
In general, the major contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• A fast and self-feedback system is proposed which can
continuously track and find the correct correspondence
between the specific domain name and IP address online;
• Summary 8 CDN service provider’s CNAME feature
strings to filter out the CDN server IP and 8 non-
homepage URL characteristics to filter out the non-
homepage server IP, which reduces the computing pres-
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sure of online correction and improves the system preci-
sion;
• Utilize both active and passive measurement to recom-
mend the passive results online with a certain error rate
and the active 100% correct results offline with a little
delay.
This paper is arranged as follows: Section II introduces
the previous related work. Section III is about the system
architecture and the four core modules briefly. Section IV
describes the key technologies applied in each core module
in detail. Section V evaluates the effect of this system through
the experiments. Section VI discusses the limitation of the sys-
tem and the future work. Finally, the conclusion is contained
in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
As mentioned above, the main cause for the incorrect DNS
RRs is that there are a variety of attacks to DNS. The current
research hotspot could be divided into two types of ideas, one
is using the DNS protocol extension fields plus encryption
technology to guarantee the security of communication. Zou
et al. [27] introduced 8 kinds of DNS security architecture
which is based on the current DNS protocol to expand, such
as DNSSEC [14], DNSCurve [5], WSECDNS [19], DDNS
[7] and CoDoNS [18], all of them are the conclusion solution
to overcome weakness in the DNS protocol.
Another is for one specific type of DNS attacks to design
protection scheme without changing protocol. Regarding the
DNS spoofing, Alqahtani et al. [2] proposed to use IP address
based authentication instead of using domain name based. For
the DNS cache poisoning, [10], [18] design a methodology
called Adaptive-Cache of DNS by caching mechanism and
backward compatible with the current standards of DNS.
These solutions mainly aim to detect and defend the causing
factors, but the main idea of this paper is different from them.
SFCSD don’t defend against the attack directly, however, in
case of the existence of these attacks, it analyzes the DNS RRs
and filter out the wrong one which can’t directly access the
websites correctly. From the point of view of attackers, they
fail in the last step of the attacks. From the user accessing
to the common websites, they directly bypass the possible
attacks in the first step.
The idea of Jain et al. [12] is similar to ours, both can build
an auto-updated whitelist, but the difference is that SFCSD
find the correct and available correspondence of domain name
and IP which is not only correct in resolution, but also can
access correct common websites. While they use the third-
party Google public domain name server to resolute the
domain name, Kuhrer et al. [13] find that the open domain
name server is increasingly vulnerable to attacks, so these
third-party may also provide a wrong DNS RRs.
III. FRAMEWORK
As shown in Figure 2, SFCSD can be divided into four core
modules, IP & Domain Input Module (IDIM), Matching &
Filtering Module (MFM), Passive Correction Module (PCM)
and Active Correction Module (ACM).
IDIM receives specific IP & Domain strings from the user
and system itself, then inputs them to MFM and ACM. MFM
resolves the passive traffic to match the IP & Domain strings
and outputs initially suspicious (IP, Domain) to PCM. PCM
combines with ACM to correct the initial outputs and sends
recommended (IP, Domain) to IDIM as the feedback. Each
Module has its own Functions and will be described here.
A. IP & Domain Input Module
As displayed in Figure 2, IDIM consists of two Functions,
System Input Function (SIF) and User Input Function (UIF).
SIF is to receive the specific strings from SFCSD itself, which
is automatically generated by PCM. UIF is user-oriented to
obtain users’ interests. The specific strings are classified into
two types, Domain string and IP string. Both of them can
be input by the user, while the IP string can also be auto-
generated. IDIM sends the specific strings to MFM and ACM
as the first filter conditions to narrow the focus range, and
its auto-generated IP string is the basis of the self-feedback
mechanism to expand search range and improve the whole
system’s effects.
B. Matching & Filtering Module
As Figure 2 indicates, MFM contains two Functions, Regex
Matching Function (RMF) and IP Filtering Function (IFF).
RMF extracts all relevant IP, Domain, CNAME and webpage
contents which match the specific strings from IDIM by re-
solving rapidly large-scale SSL, DNS and HTTP traffic based
on previous work [15]. Its main function is to narrow the focus
range and reduce unnecessary overload. IFF receives RMF’s
outputs to filter out the CDN server IP and non-homepage
URL by some feature strings, and sends the suspicious (IP,
Domain) to PCM for further analyses. Its main function is,
under the conditions of guaranteeing the online processing
speed and the system recall rate, to reduce PCM’s processing
pressure as much as possible.
C. Passive Correction Module
As suggested in Figure 2, PCM is made up of two Func-
tions, Fingerprint Comparison Function (FCF) and Statistics
& Analysis Function (SAF). FCF generates webpage finger-
prints online with the webpage contents sent by MFM, which
are all possible homepages filtered by IFF, and compares them
with the standard homepage websites fingerprints generated
by ACM to calculate the similarity of fingerprints. Its main
function is to correct the suspicious (IP, Domain) which
appears in HTTP by utilizing webpage fingerprint algorithm.
SAF analyzes the outputs from MFM first, if the correctness
possibility of (IP, Domain) is more than a certain threshold
T1 such as 98%, it will provide them for users and send them
to IDIM directly as a feedback. While if the (IP, Domain) are
very suspicious but not sure, namely the possibility is smaller
than T1 but larger than T2 such as 90%, it will send them
to ACM as recommended for further correction, and receives
ACM correction results to generate the IP string too.
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Fig. 2. The overview of the self-feedback system for DNS based on active and passive measurement.
D. Active Correction Module
As Figure 2 demonstrates, ACM constitutes three Func-
tions, Actively Crawling Function (ACF), Manual Correc-
tion Function (MCF) and Fingerprint Generation Function
(FGF). ACF receives the specific strings from IDIM and
the recommended (IP, Domain) from PCM to crawl relevant
data by some active methods. However, due to some wrong
cases, SFCSD needs MCF to correct by people. MCF’s main
function is picking out the 100% correct websites homepages
to FGF, correcting the recommended (IP, Domain) and out-
putting the correction results to PCM and IDIM. FGF receives
the completely correct websites homepages and generates the
websites fingerprints for FCF, which is to improve online
process speed.
IV. METHOD DESIGN
SFCSD is a self-feedback correction system for DNS based
on active and passive measurement. This section describes
the core technologies about the self-feedback mechanism, the
passive correction and the active correction respectively as
follows.
A. Self-feedback Mechanism
All functions work together to achieve the self-feedback
mechanism. While the most important is SIF in IDIM and
SAF in PCM.
1) IP String Auto-Generation: As mentioned above, SIF
is a basis of self-feedback mechanism, its goal is to obtain
related traffic at most and narrow the focus range. As the
system continues to run, PCM will automatically generate the
IP string to IDIM, then IDIM sends these to MFM and ACM
in order to find the new (IP, domain) tuples.
At the initial stage of the system, there is no auto-generated
IP string, all of IDIM outputs are from users. When users
input a Domain string like “example.com”, MFM resolves the
DNS, SSL and HTTP traffic and extracts all relevant server IP
matching this Domain string, by PCM and ACM, the system
will generate the IP string to IDIM. When the later traffic
come, MFM will matching this IP in the traffic too, if the
(IP, Domain) always appears together in PCM recommended
results, PCM regards them as the corrected results to users.
The more frequently a (IP, Domain) appears, the more likely
it is correct.
2) Possibility Calculating Method: The main function of
SAF is to calculate the possibility of the correctness of all (IP,
Domain) found in traffic. The possibility calculating method
is the theoretical basis for the self-feedback mechanism as
follows.
The initial possibility of the (IP, Domain) first found in
the passive traffic is 0%, after matched by RMF, each (IP,
Domain) matched with the specific strings has a possibility
depending on the protocol which the (IP, Domain) come
from. The possibility of SSL is denoted as s%, DNS is
d% and HTTP is h%, because of the different rank of
protocol security, s% > h% > d%. If a (IP, Domain)
appears in two or three protocols at a short time window
such as 5 minutes, its possibility will increase as Equa-
tion (1) shows. In a similar procedure, (SSL&HTTP ) =
(s + h)% − sh%, (DNS&HTTP ) = (d + h)% − dh%,
(SSL&DNS&HTTP ) = (s + d + h)% − sd% − sh% −
dh%+ sdh%.
(SSL&DNS) = s%+ (1− s%)× d%
= d%+ (1− d%)× s%
= s%+ d%− s%× d%
= (s+ d)%− sd%
(1)
And then IFF filters out the CDN server IP and non-
homepage URL relevant IP, which means to set these (IP,
Domain)’s possibilities as 0%. PCM gets all (IP, Domain)
whose possibility more than 0%, and if the (IP, Domain) come
from HTTP, there is a further correction. By computing the
similarity of fingerprints denoted as sim%, the more similar
fingerprints are, the more likely the (IP, Domain) is correctly,
and the possibility is calculated in the same way.
SAM obtains the suspicious (IP, Domain) and computes
their possibilities. If the possibility meet the certain threshold
T1, SFCSD sends the passive results online with a certain error
rate to users. If the possibility is smaller than T1 but larger
than T2, SFCSD will sends these (IP, Domain) to ACM.
Since some web servers don’t response the IP requests,
there are two kinds of results by ACM, 100% correct and
still uncertain. ACM sends these results back to SAF, and
then SAF issues the 100% correct (IP, Domain) to users with
a little delay. All these judgment results by ACM or SAF are
available in a period of time such as one day.
Except above two operations, SAM will send all suspicious
(IP, Domain) to IDIM as a feedback, SIF receives these (IP,
Domain) with the user input and transmit all to RMF.
So far, the possibility of the correctness of (IP, Domain)
which is first found in traffic is calculated over. Given the
IP string auto-generation as the feedback, SAF will calculate
the (IP, Domain) occurrence times and last time, if the (IP,
Domain) don’t appear one day, its possibility will decrease
dec%, in contrast, if the (IP, Domain) appear one day, its
possibility will increase inc% until the threshold T1.
B. Passive Correction
The passive correction is a cooperation of IFF in MFM,
FGF in ACM and FCF in PCM. It compares the homepage fin-
gerprints generated by FGF with the online webpage filtered
by IFF and fingerprints generated by FCF for their similarity
to correct the (IP, Domain).
Its main idea is through denoting a homepage as its
fingerprint and denoting the similarity between homepage
and webpage as the hamming distance between the two
fingerprints to find the webpage from MFM similar to the
corresponding websites’ homepage, which means the server
IP in this HTTP packet has a great possibility of being the
website’s web server IP.
1) IP Filtering: IFF is the core technology of MFM. The
main goal is to filter out the Web server IP addresses that
completely can’t directly access a specific website homepage
in all traffic matching the specific string to reduce the pro-
cessing pressure of PCM. On the basis of ensuring the system
recall rate, IFF is to improve the system processing speed as
much as possible, by filtering CDN server IP in DNS and
non-homepages in HTTP.
a) CDN Filter: CDN Filter mainly filters out the IP
address of the CDN server from all server IP addresses found
in DNS. Since currently many websites will use CDN to
accelerate the webpages loading speed, and users visit the
CDN server first, then the CDN server accesses the webpage
TABLE I
CDN FILTER STRINGS
No. CDN Service Provider Feature Strings in CNAME
1 Akamai
akamai
akadns
edgesuite
edgekey
2 Amazon Cloudfront
cloudfront
amazon
3 ChinaCache chinacache
4 CloudFlare cloudflare
5 EdgeCast edgecast
6 Fastly fastly
7 Incapsula incap
8 Tencent
cdntip
dnsv1
9 Other
passvpn
a-msedge1
edge
from the source websites to back to users. So there are
many CDN server IP addresses found from the DNS traffic
resolution, which aren’t the real web server IP address. The
key of the CDN filter is that almost all the CDN service
providers will have an obvious feature string in CNAME
record, as Table I shows. The filtration steps are as follows:
À Extract the CNAME requests from the DNS;
Á If the extract CNAME contains the feature strings in
Table I, add the server IP to the CDN server IP list,
otherwise do nothing;
Â Output all suspicious server IP which aren’t in CDN
server IP list.
b) URL Filter: URL Filter is mainly filters out all non-
homepages in HTTP, because FGF considers the homepage
as a symbol to represent the website, so it only generates the
fingerprint for the homepage. If URL Filter can ensure that
the two comparing pages are homepages, which can improve
speed and effect of FCF. The filtration steps are as follows:
À Extract the URL of the HTTP packets;
Á Filter the URL by the simple rules in Table II;
Â In order to ensure the recall rate, only when the URL
matching the non-homepages URL features, out the
server IP and HTTP packets;
The key of URL Filter is to find useful homepage URL
characteristics. Due to the URL redirection and URL rewrites
in the web server, not all URLs with only domain can access
the homepage, and there are some other URL patterns can
access the homepage either. Thus, the 8 URL patterns are
proposed in Table II, T indicates the URL with that pattern
is a homepage, and F indicates not. We realize these patterns
by regular expression which can reduce the delay online as
much as possible.
2) Fingerprint Generation: The Fingerprint Generation
algorithm is SimHash [20], which is used to check massive
text duplicates by Google. Through a series of operations,
TABLE II
URL FILTER RULES
No. URL Patterns Examples T/F
1 With only domain www.example.com T
2
With domain less
than 5 characters
www.example.com
/#doj
T
3
Containing strings
like “index.html”
www.example.com
/.../index.html
T
4
Containing non-text
suffix like “.exe”
www.example.com
/.../download.exe
F
5
With several numbers
followed by suffix
www.example.com
/.../n47827153.html
F
6
Containing strings
like “redirect”
www.example.com
/.../redirect...
F
7
With over
2 parameters
www.example.com
/.../?a=1&c=2&c=3
F
8
With over
50 characters
www.example.com
/.../.../...
F
a document can be transferred into a 64-bit string, namely
the fingerprint, and then by computing the hamming distance
between the two fingerprints to determine whether the two
documents are similar, if the distance is less than a certain
threshold N, they are.
In short, SimHash steps are as follows:
À Participle: participle the source text into some charac-
teristic words, and remove the noise words to build a
standard word sequence and weight for each word;
Á Hash: hash each word into a string of numbers to reduce
the document dimension;
Â Weight: according to the word weight, process the string
of numbers generated in step 2 to form a weighted string;
Ã Unite: for each word, accumulate all the string of num-
bers to one;
Ä Reduce dimension: change the string of numbers from
the Step 2 into binary string, namely the fingerprint.
3) Fingerprint Matching: Through the above steps, FGF
generates the specific websites’ fingerprints into database.
FCF obtains the webpage contents which are filtered by URL
and feature string, and then generates the webpage fingerprints
online and calculates the distance between the two webpage
Fingerprints. The smaller the distance is, the more possible to
find the web server IP address is.
C. Active Correction
1) Actively Crawling: In addition to obtaining the required
IP address corresponding of the domain, it is necessary to
obtain the homepage of the specific websites and generate
the websites fingerprints. For the former, ACF utilizes the
following four methods to obtain, and for the latter, ACF uses
spiders like Wget [21] to crawl automatically.
• DNS server resolution: By simulating normal users ac-
cessing a website to obtain the DNS response from the
domain name server and find the web server IP;
TABLE III
POPULAR PING SERVICE ONLINE
No. Name Websites
1 ping.eu http://ping.eu/ping/
2 CA App Synthetic Monitor https://asm.ca.com/en/ping.php
3 HostTracker http://host-tracker.com
4 kakawang http://www.webkaka.com
5 Internet Supervision http://internetsupervision.com
6 yperSpin http://www.hyperspin.com
7 Alertra http://www.alertra.com
TABLE IV
POPULAR HOSTS TOOLS
No. Name Websites
1 huhamhire-hosts http://code.google.com/p/huhamhire-hosts
2 Smarthosts http://code.google.com/p/smarthosts
3 HostsX http://code.google.com/p/hostsx
• Third-party database: By collecting the required data
from the third-party IP database, such as ARIN [4], RIPE
[17], APNIC [3] and IPIP [11], etc;
• Ping service online: By using the ping tools provided
by the websites in Table III to get the specific domain
corresponding IP;
• Hosts tools: By tracking and crawling the popular hosts
tools in Table IV periodically to obtain the web server
IP.
2) Manual Correction: Since the standard of correct (IP,
Domain) is to directly access the specific websites correctly,
while the data obtained by ACF contains some wrong cases,
MCF has further correction as follows to make sure the
homepages and (IP, Domain) are 100% correct:
À Modify the local HOSTS file with the (IP, Domain) to
be corrected;
Á Simulate a browser accessing the websites by Webdriver
[22];
Â Judge the correctness of (IP, Domain) based on the
response;
Ã If the program can’t judge definitely, it’s time to people
help.
V. EVALUATION
This section will evaluate the system effects about the
recall, accuracy, precision rate and online processing perfor-
mance.
A. Dataset
We selected the top 50 Chinese websites from the Alexa [1]
rank as users’ inputs, given the workload of manual labeling,
we only acquired running logs from the online testing program
in the CSTNET [24] within 2 hours. The overview of the
dataset is in Table V.
Each packet matching the specific strings will generate a
log which contains the packet information, including protocol,
matching string, server IP, and host name for SSL, domain
TABLE V
DATASET OVERVIEW
Overview Count
Total Logs 73,627
Matched Regex strings 47
Total IP 11,360
Total URL 50,267
Total (IP, Domain) 13,621
name for DNS, URL for HTTP. The Total Logs means the
number of different logs within 2 hours in CSTNET. The
Matched Regex strings means the number of these top 50
websites captured in 2 hours. Total IP, URL and (IP, Domain)
are the number of different cases in this 2 hours. The system
needs to correct the 13,621 (IP, Domain) to obtain the 100%
correct ones.
B. Evaluation indicators
The evaluation indicators is the recall and accuracy rate as
calculated by Equation (2), (3). NC→C′ is the correct (IP,
Domain) judged as correct and NC→I′ is the correct (IP,
Domain) misjudge as incorrct. NI→C′ is the incorrect (IP,
Domain) misjudged as correct and NI→I′ is the incorrect (IP,
Domain) judged as incorrect.
Recall rate measures the rate of correct (IP, Domain) judged
as correct out of the total correct (IP, Domain). Accuracy rate
measures the rate of incorrect and correct (IP, Domain) which
are judged correctly with respect to all the (IP, Domain).
TP =
NC→C′
NC→C′ +NC→I′
(2)
ACC =
NC→C′ +NI→I′
NC→C′ +NC→I′ +NI→C′ +NI→I′
(3)
Given the heavy imbalance of the dataset (even if judging
all (IP, Domain) are incorrect, the accuracy rate can achieve
98%), add the precision rate, which calculated by Equation
(4), measures the rate of correct (IP, Domain) judged as
correct out of the judged correct (IP, Domain).
P =
NC→C′
NI→C′ +NC→C′
(4)
C. Results
As indicated in Table VI, the system final results in the
optimal SimHash threshold can achieve 94.30% precision,
93.07% recall and 99.78% accuracy.
For the different SimHash thresholds to the system, as
Figure 3 displays, when the threshold is selected 3, the system
achieves a good balance between the precision and recall rate.
TABLE VI
EXPERIMENTS RESULTS
Results Count
Correct (IP, Domain) 231
CDN server IP 640
Non-Homepage URL 10,347
Accuracy 99.78%
Recall 93.07%
Precision 94.30%
Fig. 3. The threshold of SimHash hamming distance versus Accuracy &
Recall & Precision rate.
D. Online Testing
We test SFCSD on the CSTNET, by using a server with the
performance as Table VII to evaluate the system’s processing
speed and the number of (IP, Domain) found. After a period of
time running, SFCSD’s online processing speed can achieve
8Gbps, due to the self-feedback mechanism, the system will
gradually increase the automatic specific IP & Domain strings.
For the average of each Domain string, SFCSD can find 1000
possibly corresponded IP per day, and correct about 200.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Limitation
This system mainly has two limitations:
In order to meet the online processing speed under the
condition of certain computing resources, SFCSD reduces the
algorithm complexity of online key technology as much as
possible, so the evasion method is very simple that is to
change the CDN CNAME or homepage URL not to contain
the feature strings. But considered the certain strings almost
are the company’s name to represent who is it, so the feature
string can still work by tracking continuously.
TABLE VII
STANDALONE PERFORMANCE
Operation System Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.2
CPU Intel Xeon E5-4620 2.2GHz 8 Core
Memory DDR3 256GB
Network Card 10 Gigabit DPDK
Hard Dist SATA 500GB
The webpage fingerprint algorithm has a premise that the
webpage content is the plaintext from HTTP, but for HTTPs,
this method will be immediately invalid. Given this problem
is aim to all the passive measurement, not just for SFCSD. It
still can filter incorrect (IP, Domain) by the regex matching,
CDN filter to reduce manual correction workload as much as
possible.
B. Future Work
Future work will aim at above limitations and be divided
into two aspects. One is to extract a few other webpage
characteristics to assist the SimHash and improve the whole
system’s effects. Another is try to analyze some previous work
about identifying the similar cipher text without decryption [6]
for HTTPS.
VII. CONCLUSION
Currently, there are many malicious or non-malicious activ-
ities which lead to the incorrect DNS resource records, such
as server configuration errors, DNS caching poisoning and
DNS spoofing, etc.
This paper focuses on whether the DNS resource records
can have direct access to the websites correctly, proposing a
self-feedback correction system for DNS (SFCSD) based on
active and passive measurement.
Through the possibility calculating method proposed as the
theoretical basis of the self-feedback mechanism and all func-
tions work together, it can find 1000 possibly corresponded
IP per day for the average of each Domain string on the
CSTNET.
By utilizing SSL, DNS and HTTP traffic together, filtering
with 8 CDN and 8 URL features, verifying by SimHash, the
passive correction can achieve 94.3% precision and 93.07%
recall rate when the threshold of SimHash hamming distance
sets 3 in the test dataset.
Combined with the active correction, under the above
conditions, SFCSD can achieve 8Gbps processing line speed
stand-alone and correct about 200 corresponded IP per day
for the average of each Domain string.
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